Vital Systems Security

The New York Times has an article today that is worth a read on the distribution of Homeland Security Grants to states. The basic topics are pretty familiar, so it doesn’t bear saying too much about it (but read the full text after the jump). A couple notes that resonate with various work we have done in the past.

• As was true with civil defense, local officials are looking to find ways to use these funds to deal with problems that they face on a routine basis. So there are some interesting concepts emerging like “all-crimes” programs (a complement to all-hazards).

• There is a clear normative conflict — of the type that Lyle, Dale, and others have analyzed in public health-health security discussions, and that Andy and I summarize in the new biosecurity volume — between the way that central officials think about threats and the way that local officials do. Local officials here seem to have something like a classic cost-benefit approach in thinking about crime, as opposed to an orientation to catastrophic terrorism. No doubt, as is the case in public health, one could trace a tradition of approaching crime that emphasizes archival statistics and a “maximization” logic in the allocation of resources that comes into conflict with “existential threat” thinking.

• There is a concern with a creep in the mission. Typical: Catastrophic events keep not happening, so it is hard to stay focused on them. It is easier, notably, in a military in which all you *do* is think about such threats. But harder when you are a local agency spending 99% of your time on other things that seem more pressing, and that are now being starved for funds due to the downturn in local government revenues.

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Props to Elaine Grossman over at GSN for a fascinating story on Congressional concerns with the recently unveiled (Draft) National Response Framework. You might have to scroll down a bit to find it. We had a bit of chatter about the NRF on this blog, and perhaps this story will spark further discussion. The gist of the concerns about the plan — oops, sorry, “framework” — is that, well, it is not a plan but rather it is only a framework(!) And a not-so-clear one at that. Familiar critiques include: lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities — even duplication and overlap; the use of ambiguous terminology and concepts; and a conspicuous absence of operational details which could provide useful guidance about implementation… DHS is also facing criticism for the lack of transparency in drafting/writing process for the document, which it vociferously denies, claiming that expertise and personnel across disciplines and agencies were brought to the table in crafting the NRF. Unless I’m misreading things, I do believe the general sense is that DHS has messed something up!

This might be a good time, by the bye, to refer the, um, five of us to an informative report put out by NYU which highlights some of the legal and organizational incongruities cropping up as a result of recent legislation and an orientation towards the catastrophic. I bring it up here because it is an interesting piece to this changing puzzle we’re dealing with, and for me anyway helps to clarify how it is that FEMA is really getting pushed and shoved all over the place in terms of its responsibilities, and equally: its capabilities.

Reporting from LA…. The southern CA firestorm is perhaps FEMA’s first major test since Hurricane Katrina. A big task is the evacuation. There are multiple fires and they are traveling fast and in unpredictable ways. People sometimes want to stay to protect their houses in the absence of firefighters. One criticism likely to emerge is that the SD fire dept lacked resources, despite the known fire danger. Another - which is always noted after fires, but does not seem to affect development - is that people should not be allowed to build houses in these zones. So far it seems that the evacuation has been handled in a very different way than New Orleans. According to reports, the 20,000 people in Qualcomm stadium are well-fed, the national guard is there with automatic weapons in case of social disorder. On the other hand it is not clear that there are sufficient resources available for people showing up in evacuation centers, such as the race track in Del Mar. This is a very different situation than Katrina, of course. First, the city is not totally engulfed: most of its infrastructure (communications, electricity, transportation) is operational. Second, the race and class dynamic is different: many of the burned and threatened areas are wealthy suburbs, and residents have resources and networks to find adequate accommodations after evacuating. Third, state and federal leaders know they are under scrutiny and must demonstrate quick response (not to mention that the CA governor is from the same party as the president). FEMA has set up a Joint Field Office in Pasadena; USNORTHCOM, the Red Cross, etc are in action. A lot now depends on how much longer the heat and Santa Ana winds continue….

Oct 22, 2007 (CIDRAP News) The White House recently issued a lengthy homeland security directive aimed at bolstering the response of federal, state, and local public health systems to national emergencies such as bioterrorist attacks, influenza pandemics, and natural disasters. Read the rest of this entry »

Anthony and I are developing some conceptual equipment around ‘biopreparedness’ in relation to Syn-BERC. One area where we are stumped relates directly to the recent posts on the National Response Framework, and I thought would make an interesting VSS discussion. The issue is about what kinds of thinking go into the design of scenario-based plans such as the NRF. As Dale noted, current DHS plans are oriented towards fifteen scenarios. The question is: what criteria are employed to develop the specific scenarios used in exercises? Dale wondered whether the number of scenarios (and apparently distinct response-assemblages for each scenario) meant a shift away from all-hazards planning. But assuming that all-hazards, or generic, planning is still the goal, how does one develop specific ’scenario-events’ in order to test generic preparedness? I think the answer might be that, in the language of the document, “The focus of the scenarios is on response capabilities and needs, not threat-based prevention activities.” That is, specific events can be used to test generic capabilities, not responses to that event itself. Still, there is a fundamental question of which specific events should be used that remains a question of criteria. Second question: given that the development of scenario plans, and their exercise in practice, involves many distinct and often incomensurable expert-groups (public health, international security, bioscience, etc), how are truth-claims adjudicated (i.e. this type of response is ‘realistic’, etc.)? Any thoughts would be much appreciated–including in particular “ethnographic” insights from discussions with actual scenario planners.

A quick follow on Dale’s post. I just wanted to direct attention to the nice posting from demfromct at dailykos on pandemic preparedness, emergency response, and related matters. A recent post addressing the National Response Framework included this choice graphic on pandemic flu authorities and responsibilities that seemed too good to let slip past. Note the dead bird in the upper left. (What is going on with that bird exactly? Maybe just resting? Hanging upside down? Etc.) Dynamic org. charts of emergency response certainly have come a long way since U.S. Civil Defense in 1950.

This was off my radar — like lots of things lately. So DHS has decided to whittle down the NRP, and turn it into the NRF. Ta-da! The problem is, apparently, that the very emergency managers who will be called on to implement it are *totally* against it. Why? In part, because it is oriented towards 15 scenarios around which are to be formed essentially 15 distinct assemblages. Wait a minute! What happened to all-hazards preparedness? Don’t ask DHS; it is figuring out how to ride out what will probably, in the end, not cause such a big brouhaha: the latest proclamation from the GAO on just how modest — or is it moderate? — progress has been in implementing necessary reforms in the nation’s newest Cabinet-level agency. Check it out here, but prepare yourself for a long read. A thread on either of these items is welcome and encouraged — especially the former, I think!

A recent hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security dealt with the ongoing reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. My question: does rebuilding and development form a component of vital systems security? Why is the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding a Homeland Security official (rather than Housing and Urban Development for example)? See his comments here. The issues he deals with include: housing, levees, education, criminal justice system, healthcare, and economic development. The only traditional “vital systems” topic here is the levees.

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At two recent press conferences, Chertoff explained the DHS risk management approach and talked about how critical infrastructure protection works. A snippet:
“So based on analysis that we have done through our infrastructure protection programs, we’ve identified a list of approximately a little over 2,000 individual national assets that have national or regional significance. These are truly the critical infrastructure across the entire country, and they reflect the kinds of things that you would imagine, in terms of power plants or dams that are located in an area in which an attack could have a regional or even a national impact. This does not include popcorn factories or hotdog stands or any of the stuff which came in for ridicule over the last year. It is a focused effort to put weight on those elements of infrastructure that represent something more than just the impact on population, but a regional or even a national impact.”

New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg testified in Senate hearings today about the financing formulas for DHS funding. He has raised the same issues in prior hearings. The question is whether a new Congress means that these criticisms might actually go somewhere.