A conference hosted by the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) is now underway with the purpose of bringing together business leaders and risk executives from industry to talk about ways to plan for a pandemic flu outbreak. We at ARC have had little in the way of concerted discussion about preparedness in the private sector — at least, I’ve not been aware of much chatter about it on our end.
As good second-order observers, we have probably noted that interesting distinctions have been made regarding “where” preparedness occurs. This emergent assemblage finds its most concrete form in the activities and practices located, at least in a certain sense, in the domains of public health, emergency management, and increasingly, homeland security. It is interesting that this assemblage works with and reifies distinctions between all this, and the private sector. In the American context, it seems that there exists a kind of rehashing of familiar debates about what “the state” can do, and what can and must be left to the private sector — as well as, for that matter, non-profits (have a look here for a recent report on Bay Area non-profits and disaster non-readiness). Hurricane Katrina, as we recall, produced the now-familiar mantra that “we [i.e., the state] can’t do everything” — which a truism, but an interesting one. Still we might ask, strictly as a matter of critical inquiry: why not?
Anyway, this is a ramble, but it’s headed, I think, towards the following question: Where are the fault lines between public and private in the context of preparedness and vital systems? Is this distinction valid, empirically? I think conceptual work in this area is crucial.