The Next Pandemic

By: Carlo Caduff
Posted in avian flu, biopolitics, preparedness, swine flu on December 31st, 2009

The novel H1N1 virus has been elected the “virus of the year.” According to the journal Science, the pandemic was a “near miss.” As the authors of the short piece argue, the “H1N1 virus was less virulent than feared, but the next pandemic could be worse.” Prepare for the next pandemic is the message.

What kind of work is the trope of the Next Pandemic doing? Might it not be worth investigating the current pandemic first, before we jump to the next? Before we orient ourselves towards the near future, it might be necessary to first inhabit the recent past in some meaningful way. What, in fact, has just happened? Apparently, it is easier for experts to take responsibility for the future than for the past.

Just to remind ourselves:

1. Most experts predicted the emergence of an H5 virus. It was an H1 virus.

2. Most experts predicted that the pandemic would start off in South-East Asia. It turned out to be closer to home.

3. Most experts predicted that it would be a devastating event. WHO now calls it a “moderate” pandemic.

4. Most experts predicted serious consequences for critical infrastructure.

Good luck with the next predictions! Trust your expert!

H1N1 Deaths and the Severity Calculus

By: Lyle Fearnley
Posted in risk, surveillance, swine flu on December 23rd, 2009

Calculations of the severity of the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic have been sorely lacking.  As Laurie Garret and other experts noted early on, the lack of an index of severity in WHO’s pandemic alert system perhaps led some governments—and certainly much of the public—to consider ‘pandemic’ as an indication of danger rather than a reflection of geographical prevalence.  H1N1 was responded to as if it were the actualization of the potential H5N1 outbreak everyone was waiting for.  Or it was for a moment.  For no sooner did some numbers start coming in then the threat began to be downplayed: death rates appeared far lower than seasonal flu.

Now, in a report issued on December 12th by CDC, we have some more numbers about how many people have caught the pandemic flu, how many have been hospitalized and how many have died in the United States.  The summarized data presented in the media is distilled in the number 9,820: deaths from H1N1.  This is usually presented either to downplay the severity, by comparing the number to the 36,000 seasonal flu deaths estimated to occur each year; or, conversely, to demonstrate the danger of the outbreak through a comparison with the previous estimate, one month ago, of only 3,900 H1N1 deaths.  But as we know with influenza, it is important to get behind the numbers.  How are these calculations made?
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Call for Papers: Epidemic Orders

By: Carlo Caduff
Posted in avian flu, biopolitics, bioscience, catastrophe models, conferences and talks, early warning systems, emergency response, preparedness, risk, security frameworks, swine flu, vital systems on December 15th, 2009

CALL FOR PAPERS

Behemoth – A peer-reviewed journal published by the Akademie Verlag, Berlin

Special Issue: Epidemic Orders

In the past few years, epidemic events, both actual and virtual, have made a spectacular comeback. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases such as avian and swine flu have generated great anxiety the world over, resulting in a pervasive sense of vulnerability, insecurity, and uncertainty. A powerful spirit of urgency, based on a genuine concern for human health and well-being, overdetermined by a variety of scientific, political, and economic interests, engendered a real flurry of action. In the epic battle against germs, the biopolitical state mobilized material and symbolic resources at an unprecedented scale.

In the shadow of the emerging infectious disease threat, significant shifts in public health, medical care, and scientific research have occurred. The aim of this special issue of Behemoth is to offer an initial set of diagnostic accounts. What are the domains in which fundamental shifts have occurred over the past few years? Who are the actors involved and what are the underlying logics animating these shifts in public health, medical care, and scientific research? The key aim of this issue is to draw analytic attention to recent reconfigurations and to identify the kind of epidemic orders that are taking shape today at the heart of the biopolitical state.

Please send abstracts for this special issue of Behemoth to the editor Carlo Caduff (carlocaduff@access.uzh.ch) and to Kathrin Franke (behemoth@rz.uni-leipzig.de). Deadline for submission of abstracts: 30 January 2010. Deadline for submission of articles: 30 June 2010.

PCAST Report on Swine Flu

By: Stephen Collier
Posted in preparedness, swine flu on August 25th, 2009

The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology has released its assessment of the coming swine flu resurgence and the US Government’s preparedness efforts. Press release here and full report here.

Hopefully some of our resident second order observers of pandemic preparedness can do some parsing for us…

Situation Awareness in Public Health

By: Dale A. Rose
Posted in Uncategorized on July 19th, 2009

The recent H1N1 outbreak has been fertile ground for discussion on this site and elsewhere. Borrowing a term that Stephen once brought onto this blog, there is a veritable “smorgasbord” of objects, concepts, strategies and technologies to examine and reflect upon as the world comes to grips with a bona fide pandemic event (I’ll save for Carlo to verify this claim). One such first-order concept which I would like to introduce today is “situation awareness.” The term has bubbled up a great deal lately in discussions around H1N1, especially within the various operational structures and organizations, such as HHS and CDC, taking the lead on the response side of things.

At its core, situation awareness, or SA, basically describes knowing the right information, at the right time, in the right way and in the right amount, in order to make the right decisions to improve or protect health. Although it is ostensibly applicable across all domains of public health, as a concept it is usually associated – or in any event, it eventually ties itself back to – public health emergency preparedness and response. To give an example from H1N1, response has been very much guided by demands for information that go beyond what we might call “traditional” public health surveillance and epidemiological investigation. Certain disease detection and surveillance technologies have been employed in tracking the disease, but the sources of information are disparate and varied, requiring a great deal of filtering and integration to paint a meaningful picture. From aggregate disease reporting to case level data; media and internet search term tracking to hospital bed and patient tracking; virologic surveillance to border surveillance, the array of data being produced across heterogeneous sites that constitute an increasingly global health security apparatus is staggering. Contrast these information needs with the 1976 Swine Flu event, and one begins to see a stark shift in terms of the kinds of techniques brought to bear in developing useful information for response.

Many of us blogging on VSS are familiar with various public health capabilities in the context of preparedness and response. Community mitigation strategies, countermeasure delivery, mass prophylaxis and vaccination – these are just some of the capabilities to which public health is held accountable in carrying out its preparedness and response functions. More to the point, knowledge about the state of readiness and performance of these various capabilities is also very much at the core of situation awareness. Think of knowledge about capabilities as something like the second half of a feedback loop in the production of situation awareness, the first half of which is information gleaned from signals (like flu surveillance, or internet search term use, or BioSense, etc.) in the external environment. In theory, marrying these two produces a picture not just of a health threat in near real-time, it also produces a picture of what can be done about it – what resources can be brought to bear – in like time, suggesting what likely outcomes will be. This, in turn, can suggest future states, with future interventions and future outcomes, etc etc.

For students of public health, this is a far cry from the kind of rationality that has governed public health surveillance historically: namely, a focus on the aggregation of a variety of population-level data to determine risk factors (and interventions) associated with health outcomes. I would like to suggest that public health’s traditional techniques – surveillance, epidemiological investigations, laboratory testing, etc.- are, at least at certain sites and in certain contexts, being marshaled and modified in service to the emergent need (rationality?) for situation awareness. My core argument, which I’d like to test out in this forum, is that situation awareness embodies the demand for a new kind of knowledge, one premised less on the need for ever greater quantities of data, per se, and more on the need for timely, actionable information. Again turning to H1N1, this may account for the seemingly odd development that public health officials are no longer concerned, per se, with the accuracy of aggregate case counts. Generating that information is extremely resource-intensive and, to the point I am trying to make, not all that useful for public health decision-making. At the level of actual practice, this number, the all-important “numerator” in calculating disease incidence, and “denominator” in calculating case fatality ratios – and the very core of traditional epidemiological techniques – has been backgrounded in favor of additional types of information: characteristics in severe cases, transmissibility in specific settings, such as schools and hospitals, utility of community mitigation strategies such as school closures (VERY controversial, for about a thousand reasons), and viral susceptibility to treatment and prophylaxis.

* * *

How has situation awareness emerged? What problems does it seek to address? What are its techniques? Its boundaries? What configuration of practices and knowledge arose to form it? What demands does it place on individuals? On other assemblages and apparatuses? These are complex questions worthy, I think, of further pursuit. Lyle, of course, has done a stellar job of getting at many of these issues in his discussion of BioSense and syndromics, and I should very much like to see continued discussion of, for example, the employment (failure?) of real-time disease detection technologies in the context of H1N1. A broader investigation tracing back the concept may prove fruitful. A cursory look shows situation awareness to have a very extensive history in military applications, notably around operator performance of a variety of technologies, including aircraft and other combat vehicles. (Good) pilots have, in fact, been held as exemplars in the field, having been very heavily scrutinized for how they are able to make sense of, and inject order into, a vast amount of very disparate and very quickly changing information in a high-stress environment – and achieve desired outcomes on top of that. Tracing back contemporary public health situation awareness across its various lineages in aviation, psychology, operations research and the military, could prove a very informative project.

Samimian-Darash on Biosecurity in AE

By: Stephen Collier
Posted in Uncategorized on July 13th, 2009

Limor Samimian-Darash has a new article in American Ethnologist entitled “A pre-event configuration for biological threats: preparedness and the constitution of biosecurity events.”  The abstract is after the jump…

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Beijing and H1N1

By: Lyle Fearnley
Posted in Uncategorized on June 30th, 2009

I am meeting with the Beijing Haidian District CDC on Thursday Beijing time. As part of the meeting they have asked me to give a talk discussing H1N1 and US/WHO policies. I thought it would be useful to take advantage of our distributed network which has done a lot of thinking about this: what is the current word on H1N1 (swine-origin) influenza?

The Other Pandemic

By: Carlo Caduff
Posted in Uncategorized on June 10th, 2009

“The problem, WHO officials have said, is that after years of preparing for the threat of a pandemic strain of the deadly H5N1 avian influenza virus, many governments and people think of a pandemic as a deadly worldwide plague.”

Apparently, the WHO is now “very close” to declaring a pandemic. See below for an interesting CIDRAP piece.

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Presidential Musings on Vital Systems

By: Stephen Collier
Posted in Uncategorized on May 25th, 2009

 

 

From Bloomberg, and with a nod to Adam Leeds for sending this along: Apparently, late at night, when he has time to let his mind wander, our President muses about vulnerable, vital systems.

Separately, Obama, in response to a question on when he finds time in his schedule to sit and reflect, said he tends to be a “night-owl” and typically stays up until midnight after having dinner with his family.

He said sometimes he isn’t dealing with current matters, yet rather, mulling issues “coming down the pike.”

An example, he said, is cyber security.

“There is not a cyber attack right now,” he said. “But that’s a big critical system that is vital to our economy. It’s vital to our public health infrastructure.”

Obama said he is working to “get the wheels turning now” on how to set up systems to protect data while also allowing the government to work with the private sector and not stifle innovation.

 

Flu Diagnostics: Strategies and Infrastructure

By: Lyle Fearnley
Posted in swine flu on May 22nd, 2009

I have for a while now encountered skepticism from people who believe that the number of Novel Swine-Origin H1N1 influenza cases (especially in New York and Massachussetts) is being vastly underreported by public health authorities.  The claim is intriguing because of the fact that public health authorities are not testing comprehensively for H1N1, instead only testing cases of severe illness.  Thus the cases of “confirmed” H1N1 may be far lower than the actual total number of cases.

How is influenza diagnosed and why isn’t every suspected case tested?  First, testing for influenza is a multiple-tiered process.  Tracking the NYC Department of Health “Health Alerts” over the course of the epidemic demonstrates the rationale and infrastructure behind the shifting diagnostic policies in one public health department.  In the first report, from April 24th, the Department requested that physicians seeing patients in the following categories test for influenza A using a nasopharyngeal swab and a commercially available rapid test, PCR or immunofluorescence test (e.g., DFA or IFA):
(1) hospitalized patients with severe febrile respiratory illness of unknown etiology, or
(2) outpatients with influenza-like illness (ILI) who have traveled to California, Texas, or Mexico within the past 7 days
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