By the way, this idea about “unthinkability” is something that is worth revisiting. Of course everything is thinkable, and the really big ones all were anticipated in one way or another (as we all know, both a hurricane like Katrina and the use of planes to hit the WTC had been thought through). This is just to say that, as you suggest, the category of catastrophic/unthinkable/disastrous/low-probability highconsequence needs some rethinking, and probably some internal differentiation.

I think this is a useful starting point to think about what constitutes a catastrophe. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not interested in doing a language exercise or engaging in a sociology of framing - although framing has maybe received less attention than it might in our collective work. In any event, amongst first-order observers and practitioners I think there has occurred a kind of conflation between WMD events (i.e., ostensible future events), terrorism, and catastrophic scenarios. It seems that it’s all become one big mush. The result, one might argue, has been misguided DHS grant funding policies, in which everything that was once “unthinkable” (IEDs, bioterrorism, nuclear/dirty bomb detonation through terrorism) has received the lion’s share of attention and, for awhile, resources.

There *is* a disconnect somewhere. There is a local-federal divide over how risk is understood and mitigated. I recently attended a SUASI meeting where it was announced that an RFP would go out soon for care and shelter projects in which applicants would have to incorporate a nuclear detonation scenario into their applications in order to receive funding consideration. Imagine the consternation as a bunch of Bay Area emergency services officials, most of whom are focused principally on one thing: earthquakes (now over 95% probability of > 7.0 Mw on Hayward/San Andreas faults within 30 yrs. according USGS), are scrambling to put together some kind of “coherent” grant application that focuses mostly on earthquakes (probability known, with high confidence) with a sprinkle of nuclear detonation (probability unknown) in the mix. The kind of creative thinking that Stephen mentioned above - e.g., articulating an all-crimes strategy within law enforcement - will be hard-pressed as we are seeing, once again, that the all-hazards approach is facing its limits. Should catastrophic WMD events be understood and mitigated the same as other events (”natural” or otherwise) according to the logic of an all-hazards approach? Is the one type of catastrophic event similar to the other? Empirical evidence may be swinging towards a “no,” and that, it seems to me, should have policy and practice implications.