Vital Systems Security

In recent weeks a complex humanitarian emergency has been developing in Tajikistan, a former Soviet republic. The crisis was triggered by a severe cold snap, but its impact has been due in large part to its effect on critical infrastructures, including electricity production, food distribution, water distribution, heat, and health infrastructures. A la Beck, modernization made the Tajik population dramatically more vulnerable, especially as critical infrastructures have degraded in the post-Soviet period. The situation has not gotten much attention in the U.S. press, but the international emergency organizations have produced quite a bit of information about it. Here are a couple snippets of things related specifically to some “vital systems” dimensions of the crisis:

• An article from Relief Web about the broad breakdown in infrastructure and public health in Tajikistan, including some stuff about malaria and typhoid outbreaks.
• A post from a blog called Postman Patel about, among other things, the international dimension of the electricity shortage (Tajikistan’s neighbors aren’t delivering electricity, in part due to disputes over non-payments), and the various relief efforts that are getting underway.
• A WHO article about the effect of the blackouts on health systems.
• A UPI analysis comparing Tajikistan and Afghanistan (which is also facing extreme cold) that addresses, among other things, the importance of media coverage of Afghanistan and the increased vulnerability of Tajikistan due to the history of mega-projects in the Soviet period that, first, made people dependent on centralized infrastructures and, second, created new vulnerabilities by diverting water to major agricultural projects etc.
• A UNDP article outlining another dimension of “modernization risk” — namely that people living in apartment blocks and in cities face bigger heating problems because they are dependent on centralized infrastructures that are now breaking down. This, by the way, is something that Lucan Way and I observed when we were doing research on water and heat provision in another former Soviet republic — Georgia — a couple years back.

Stephen Flynn has a new article in Foreign Affairs with a range of familiar arguments. We are vulnerable, but our vulnerability (at least to terrorism) is not strategic, and the most damage that can be done is the result of irrational overreaction to terrorist events. Worth a read, although it is nothing new.

Curiously, the master category for Flynn is resilience. There are four dimensions:

“First, there is robustness, the ability to keep operating or to stay standing in the face of disaster…

Second is resourcefulness, which involves skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds. It includes identifying options, prioritizing what should be done both to control damage and to begin mitigating it, and communicating decisions to the people who will implement them…

The third element of resilience is rapid recovery, which is the capacity to get things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster…

Finally, resilience means having the means to absorb the new lessons that can be drawn from a catastrophe.”

In other words: vulnerability reduction, preparedness, learning. The creeds of vital systems security.