Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comments for Concept Work http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc An ARC blog Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2 Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Lyle Fearnley http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419410 Lyle Fearnley Sun, 22 Jan 2012 06:46:30 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419410 In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. "We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues." The sixty days are said to be necessary because "organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work." Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public "perception of fear" they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of 'minimizing risk' and proudly declaim that they are using "the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory" [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: <em>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html<em> New York Times article here: <em>http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg<em> In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419408 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:56:09 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419408 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. “Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”. Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by Frédéric Keck http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419407 Frédéric Keck Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:04:36 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419407 Hi Lyle Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot's Justification. I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn't seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu. "Cités" are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new "cités" can appear, such as "cité par projet" that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970's. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize "cités" or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting "un monde grippé" which no bounded form of justice can enclose. Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski's reflections on "confirmation" (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on "preparedness". Cheers Frederic Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419406 stavrianakis Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:23:37 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419406 Read more about Carlo's work here (in German): http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html

]]> Comment on Influenza: does censorship increase control? by Carlo Caduff http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2012/01/influenza-does-censorship-increase-control/comment-page-1/#comment-419405 Carlo Caduff Sat, 07 Jan 2012 20:21:27 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=425#comment-419405 Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have occurred to me. 1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative) results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted the virus to ferrets by serial passage. 2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith, Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals. 3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab. 4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” – whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” 5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please evaluate critically and clinically. 6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.“ 7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for the virus to infect humans. 8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals. Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter Palese "there's plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system." 9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%. Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population. 10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never reappeared again. 11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature. Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred. 12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public. Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have been wrong. 13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB. The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here? Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.

2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.

3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.

4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”

5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.

6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“

7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.

8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop

neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”

9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.

10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.

11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.

12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.

13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?

]]> Comment on Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory by Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/10/anthropology-beyond-social-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-419373 Rees and Boyer: Anthropology, Social, Theory, Actual, Concepts | ARC Thu, 06 Oct 2011 21:46:28 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=407#comment-419373 [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...] [...] Anthropology: Beyond Social Theory [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419369 Reconstruction: Re-problematization | ARC Tue, 20 Sep 2011 18:25:43 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419369 [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...] [...] http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/ This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink. ← externalities: science studies [...]

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419368 stavrianakis Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:41:06 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419368 We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of <em>flourishing</em>, which was the metric of our ethical engagement. Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual <em>flourishing </em>is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons. Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to. Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor. The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual. Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology. We argued previously that the capacity to contribute collaboratively to a reconstructed situation constituted a basic parameter of flourishing, which was the metric of our ethical engagement.

Today it seems clear that for anthropological about the actual flourishing is just as troubled as the deeply and inclusively human and perhaps for similar reasons.

Developing “intellectual instrumentalities”, tools derived from reflection designed to go about the analysis and synthesis of objects of thought and practice, is certainly what we have been committed to.

Initially, for Rabinow and Bennett, this involved the work of figuration, which had been a response to the initial demands from our nominal collaborators in the biosciences to justify our participation and collaboration along the lines of old divisions of labor.

The work of figuration itself did not resolve anything. Nor was it meant to. Rather, figuration took up the discursive claims of the biosciences today and proposed, on the basis of those claims, a figure that could orient inquiry. Inquiry then showed that this figure was not actual.

Actual figuration works for us at the object level not at the objective level: every milieu has figuration efforts, but it’s not one of our goals. Figures enter into our objective insofar as the efforts to produce them are discordant and so are available for inquiry as objects of anthropology.

]]> Comment on Re-problematization: Reconstruction by rabinow http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/09/re-problematization-reconstruction/comment-page-1/#comment-419362 rabinow Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:07:55 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=395#comment-419362 1. Whatever else Dewey means by "the deeply and inclusively human" it needs to be problematized. 2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities” We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC. 3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively. 4. “progressively direct inquiry” Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue. 5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction. 6. “facts of the present scene and situation” For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual. 1. Whatever else Dewey means by “the deeply and inclusively human” it needs to be problematized.

2. “the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense of that word) the intellectual instrumentalities”

We have been doing the work of designing, of developing, of forming, of producing conceptual tools and equipment here in ARC.

3. In order to be made active as a practice, this work needs to be produced and cared for collaboratively.

4. “progressively direct inquiry”

Inquiry is an ergon within a kairos characterized by discordancy aided by parakeue.

5. Dewey does not give any indication as to the subjectivation or subject position of the one capable of doing “nothing less than” reconstruction.

6. “facts of the present scene and situation”

For Dewey, a situation in the full sense does not exist independently of the need for inquiry. We translate that as determinations of the actual.

]]> Comment on Question: On Justification by stavrianakis http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2011/04/question-on-justification/comment-page-1/#comment-419349 stavrianakis Tue, 17 May 2011 13:18:41 +0000 http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/?p=377#comment-419349 It’s true to say that it is a general sociological response to a problem of how to place the practice of doing a science of the social in relation to the modes of production which constitute both the object and the environment of doing this science; as such, capitalism and critique, as terms, seem to denote different kinds of activity, different forms of observation of and intervention in social relations. As your example of the chicken coop shows, the observation of the limit to a certain way of doing something, like raising chickens, could take form in either a) writing a letter (or starting a campaign etc) or b) inventing a different kind of coop, have different effects. I thought this was one of the strengths of a program that focused on ‘situations’ in On Justification, to get away from the idea of, as you say, ‘the natural opposition between critique and capitalism’. Furthermore, it's case specific; the New Spirit is an analysis of France since the 60s; I believe several of the other collaborators on the larger project did comparative work between France and the US. The reference to bricolage is note-worthy also because one can imagine very easily how the management gurus of today can re-purpose such savage modes for savage times; http://press.grenoble-em.com/TPL_CODE/TPL_ARTICLE/PAR_TPL_IDENTIFIANT/566/32-training-programs.htm Regarding categorization and displacement relative to "Human Practices", I just have a few thoughts which require more work and a caveat, that I take categories and displacing activities as two very general terms for intellectual work of schematizing and making things; the first is that, the effort to do social scientific work with natural scientists, in a collaborative manner, on problems coming out of both their own work and their own work relative to the environments in which it exists, was formulated relative to the character of the situation of the project. i.e. there was an attempt to work within the mode of work of the bioengineers, oriented to a near future in which the bio-sciences can bring about goods of and for that future. This basic presumption, or character of the world was not put in question. Not only was it not put in question but much of Rabinow and Bennett's initial diagnostic work was a conceptual clarification back to the biologists of what it was they were doing and how it sat within a series of other ethical-political vectors. There was a 'displacement' (if I may be permitted to use that word in that way) of the usual ratio of participation and observation, in favor of the former in the service a certain description or categorization; this if you like is one way of taking up the work of the diagnostic of equipmental platforms. The blocked work in human practices in SynBERC then led to another displacement, e.g. to other venues on the web, bios-technika.com and the Studio work and the effort to find a different position and different ratio, this time oriented back towards observation. It’s true to say that it is a general sociological response to a problem of how to place the practice of doing a science of the social in relation to the modes of production which constitute both the object and the environment of doing this science; as such, capitalism and critique, as terms, seem to denote different kinds of activity, different forms of observation of and intervention in social relations. As your example of the chicken coop shows, the observation of the limit to a certain way of doing something, like raising chickens, could take form in either a) writing a letter (or starting a campaign etc) or b) inventing a different kind of coop, have different effects. I thought this was one of the strengths of a program that focused on ‘situations’ in On Justification, to get away from the idea of, as you say, ‘the natural opposition between critique and capitalism’. Furthermore, it’s case specific; the New Spirit is an analysis of France since the 60s; I believe several of the other collaborators on the larger project did comparative work between France and the US.
The reference to bricolage is note-worthy also because one can imagine very easily how the management gurus of today can re-purpose such savage modes for savage times; http://press.grenoble-em.com/TPL_CODE/TPL_ARTICLE/PAR_TPL_IDENTIFIANT/566/32-training-programs.htm

Regarding categorization and displacement relative to “Human Practices”, I just have a few thoughts which require more work and a caveat, that I take categories and displacing activities as two very general terms for intellectual work of schematizing and making things; the first is that, the effort to do social scientific work with natural scientists, in a collaborative manner, on problems coming out of both their own work and their own work relative to the environments in which it exists, was formulated relative to the character of the situation of the project. i.e. there was an attempt to work within the mode of work of the bioengineers, oriented to a near future in which the bio-sciences can bring about goods of and for that future. This basic presumption, or character of the world was not put in question. Not only was it not put in question but much of Rabinow and Bennett’s initial diagnostic work was a conceptual clarification back to the biologists of what it was they were doing and how it sat within a series of other ethical-political vectors. There was a ‘displacement’ (if I may be permitted to use that word in that way) of the usual ratio of participation and observation, in favor of the former in the service a certain description or categorization; this if you like is one way of taking up the work of the diagnostic of equipmental platforms. The blocked work in human practices in SynBERC then led to another displacement, e.g. to other venues on the web, bios-technika.com and the Studio work and the effort to find a different position and different ratio, this time oriented back towards observation.

]]>