November 7, 2007
diagnostic of biopolitics note 2 - a collaborative note from Lyle and Anthony
So Lyle had a great insight relative to our conversation yesterday regarding the diagnostic and our argument relative to the reworking of the biopolitical. In October 2007, the Berkeley Human Practices Lab had a meeting at LBNL with scientists from the Keasling Lab and teleconferenced with the Endy Lab at MIT and the MIT Human Practices policy representative. In this discussion PR made a tripartite distinction between safety, security and preparedness. Some way through the presentation a certain nervousness (bizarrely) with precision in concepts was made apparent as one of the MIT folks, rehearsing a point made by a Swiss Science and Society policy wonk, suggested that there is no need to be precise about the distinction as in German safety and security are subsumed under the same term. This was echoed by others in the room wanting to know how these distinctions could be operationalized into first order deliverables. After the session, one of the postdocs came up to me and suggested that in biology, “precise” has technical meaning that is different from “accurate”. Precise means using the same method of measurement in all your experiments His point was to suggest that we need to be accurate, and not precise per se. I reply that statements about the world may turn out not to be accurate, but if your measurement methods (distinctions / metrics) are appropriate then you can remediate your statements about the world. By having an appropriate metric, you can mark distinctiveness as well as mark patterns.
The distinction between precision and accuracy can be usefully mapped onto our discussion about biopolitical equipment and the utility of the diagnostic. As we noted, the figure of biopolitical equipment in the diagnostic is not meant to be a claim about any actual object in the world. Rather, it is an ideal-type that enables the user to make distinctions and discover patterns with precision. By making this distinction, we can avoid the trap of endless debate about what biopolitics “really is” (and the proliferation of claims about this). Rather than arguing about whether the diagnostic represents biopolitics “in truth” or accurately, we can discuss whether it is appropriate to our materials. In this sense then we return to Jerome’s conundrum, how does one choose who gets put through the diagnostic machine? As he suggests, hopefully it is not just so as to make the diagnostic work, but rather that you can use the precision in distinctions in order to work over relations. The relations you are trying to describe do not exist within the diagnostic, as such this points us to the “outside” of the diagnsitic, where the distinctions made through the diagnostic can orient inquiry but cannot describe these relations as they exist outside of it.
November 6, 2007
Use of the Diagnostic as Contemporary Equipment (or not)
I decided to move a conversation a couple of us have been having in casual interactions (cafes, hallways, shared google documents) to a forum where more people might be able to participate.
To recap, basically we have been trying to think about two things: 1) we’ve been trying to think through the utility–literally, is it useful? for what?– of the diagnostic of equipmental platforms offered to us by Rabinow & Bennet; 2) I’ve been going around asserting that a) contemporary figures need to exist in relation to at least two other figures in order to combine its elements in a way appropriately called “contemporary” b) that third (contemporary) figure is more or less emergent–that is, in the process of formation– in many of our projects.
Specifically, Jerome has been concerned with the fact that it seems that, within the diagnostic, only certain kinds of things get taken up as important or as worthy of being used in the analysis (for example, it seems to be a requirement at least there there be some kind of problem to which somebody is trying to develop a more or less rational-in the sense of consistent–equipental response). Additionally, he’s been wondering (please excuse by liberty in offering such a limited characterization, Jerome) how to account for the very selection process that occurs–how does he, or anyone, make judgements about what to talk about, what to group together, what to see as having affinities, etc.
At the same time as Jerome has been doing this questioning, Anthony has been provoking me with the assertion that, among his Eurocrats, there is neither an emergent third figure nor even any sense of a problem .
I’ll offer my response to the latter (Anthony) first, in that it leads back to the former (Jerome): I would argue that Anthony’s Eurocrats aren’t operating in a contemporary mode (there’s not much contemporary about trench warfare, after all), so there should be no surprise that there’s no emergent third figure which is attempting to remediate a percieved problem.
To Jerome: Are only certain kinds of things taken up as interesting by the diagnostic out of the endless infinity of human possibility? yes. How is the decision as to which elements made? I would argue that this is the question of “mode of ontology” (how are things taken up so as that they are able to be worked on?). Inasmuch as the Diagnostic is itself an element of contemporary equipment, its proper mode of ontology–what it’s geared towards seeing and taking up as interesting–is the emergent. Quite literally it is for seeing emergence.
These means, among other things, that it is not for everything or everybody. There are modes of ontology for whih it would be inappropriate or useless. For example, if one were some kind of monk living in a mountain valley in search of eternal or transcendental truths, the examples of (what we’ve decided to call) destinctiveness and patterning that the diagnostic allows us to see what be utterly meaningless.
So we’re moving towards some kind of answer to some of our general questions: Is the diagnostic usefull? Only if what one is doing is some form of the anthropology of the contemporary. What is it useful for? Among other things (yet to be named) identifying elements of destinctiveness and patterning between projects.
But Both Jerome and Anthon’y questions have led me to another question: (How) can one take up decidedly non-contemporary objects in the contemporary mode?
One could, for example, should that our ideal typical monks are in fact engaged in developing a sort of emergent equipmental platform that allows them to beter pursue their transcendental truths. This fact would be of no concern to them. Would such an analysis still be collaboration (the mode of composition appropriate to the contemporary)? If so, we must refine what we mean by “collaboration”. If not, can we say that the anthropology of the contemporary can only be used to understand itself?
March 1, 2007
EVENT: Equipment and Ethics 3/8/07
There will be a discussion of Rabinow and Bennett’s work on equipment and human practices in Rabinow’s office at 2pm, Thursday, March 8th. Please read the attached article before attending.
February 17, 2007
Changes to the Wiki
Has anyone else noticed that the ARC blogs have really started to “buzz”? It seems that there’s tremendous energy out there. Inspired by at least three different conversation going on right now (”The Social” on the Biopower and the Contemporary Blog , The discussion of metaphor and ideology on Lab Notes and the revisting of mode on Lab Notes), I’ve decided to take it upon myself to move some of the concept work stuff some of us Labinar-types did last semester on the Drupal to the wiki, as well as make new entries based on the blog discussions. Maybe this will be a more efficient space for delving into the concept work?
the wiki link is at: http://www.anthropos-lab.net/arcwiki/index.php/ARC_Lexicon