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Influenza: does censorship increase control?
Recently, avian influenza has returned to public attention, by coincidence appearing at the same time in three different settings: a Hong Kong poultry market; a Shenzhen bus driver; and laboratories in the Wisconsin and the Netherlands. Though the timing of the events was coincidental, it made clear that 'avian influenza' is a viral object literally cultured by human labors, in the market or the petri dish. It also raised important questions about how these human labors contribute to increasing danger, security or preparedness.
On December 21, the New York Times reported that the National Security Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) had asked the journals Science and Nature to redact certain portions of journal articles that reported the findings of experiments conducted in Wisconsin and the Netherlands. These experiments “evolved” the H5N1 influenza virus in the laboratory, then injected them into ferret assays and measured the rates of transmission between the ferrets (see Carlo Caduff's dissertation for detailed anthropological critique of the ferret assay). They claimed to succeed in developing laboratory strains that were far more transmissible than the H5N1 currently 'at large'. This is significant because human-to-human transmissible--while perhaps occurring in isolated cases--remains low for H5N1, which thus far prevents the virus from becoming a pandemic.
A number of scientists subsequently complained about the NSABB's “request”, describing it as censorship. Yet it would be wrong to reduce their argument to a simple defense of “freedom” and the citadel of scientific inquiry. Rather, their questions cut to the core of the kinds of governance that are legitimate and effective for dealing with complex biological threats like avian influenza and advanced molecular biology.
Richard Ebright, of Rutgers University, argued: "The proposed redactions are nothing more than a public relations measure – window dressing – intended to convey the impression that the issue is being addressed and thereby to minimize negative public reaction and deflect calls for effective regulation,"
Wendy Barclay, of Imperial College London, pointed to the difficulty of calculating the costs and benefits of preventing publication of the research. "I am not convinced that withholding scientific know-how will prevent the highly unlikely scenario of misuse of information, but I am worried that it may stunt our progress towards the improved control of this infectious disease," she said.
ARC has previously written about the NSABB and its governance of biological research in this green paper. In this paper, we argued that the NSABB accurately identified contemporary biological research as posing problems of “low probability, high consequence”-- for example, the risk of a bioterrorist attack cannot be easily calculated in probabilistic terms, yet the occurrence of even a single one would carry high political, vital and economic consequences. Paradoxically, NSABB operates in a mode that attempts to minimize risks, a strategy of regulation we argued is intrinsically ineffective for governing the kinds of situations NSABB tasks itself with. We argued that NSABB employs a strategy of security or regulation for a situation that demands a strategy of preparedness.
A particularly ridiculous clause of the NSABB's request involved negotiating with the journals "to agree on a procedure whereby edited versions of the papers are published, but bona fide researchers can gain access to the crucial methods and other details that have been removed." Bone fide researchers? Doesn't anybody remember that the anthrax mailings were most likely done by a top-level security clearance insider? It is frightening to me the way that evil is consistently pushed to the outsider: it is always the imagined guy with a makeshift lab in some foreign mountain cave, not the white-collar American Nobel prize winner.
And because of this, I am not willing to let the scientists completely off the hook, either. The scientists describe this research as necessary for improving our ability to control the virus. But precisely a major difficulty--that should not be glossed over-- is the disconnect between making knowledge and the actual control of the virus. As Anthony S. wrote to me in an e-mail, does it make sense to talk about “control” when we are talking about influenza? A lot of scientists mentioned the need to develop a vaccine for the virus. But vaccines for a specific virus can be easily produced; the problem has always been knowing which viral strain is going to cause the pandemic. What the scientists are talking about, actually, is ongoing research on a 'universal' influenza vaccine. Such a vaccine may indeed be one element of a preparedness strategy. But there remain few ideas about how one would actually undertake a program to control the spread of influenza even with such a vaccine, as production, distribution and implementation are difficulties that cannot be solved through work in the laboratory.
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Thanks for this post, Lyle. I have been following the recent discussion and a few things have
occurred to me.
1. The debate comes as no surprise to me. This kind of research has been going on since
at least 2005. So far, most experiments were not successful. Taronna Maines and her
colleagues published a paper in 2006 in PNAS where they reported their (negative)
results. These experiments, it seems, where not successful because the scientists
recombined the H5N1 virus with influenza viruses that are transmitting easily among
humans (H1 and H3). Fouchier and Kawoaka used a different method. They adapted
the virus to ferrets by serial passage.
2. The adaptation of a virus to a ferret is one of the oldest techniques in influenza
research. The technique was developed originally in1933 by Wilson Smith,
Christopher Howard Andrewes and Sir Patrick Playfair Laidlaw in Great Britain. It’s
a very simple and very basic technique. It’s nothing sophisticated. You would expect
it on a farm, but not in a high-tech laboratory. Yet even in a high-tech laboratory
scientists are using such an antique and, excuse the expression, old-fashioned
technique as adapting viruses by serial passage to animals.
3. The technique behind the research conducted by Fouchier and Kawaoka is thus not
very exciting. There is no brilliant idea behind it. And you probably don’t even need
the paper in order to replicate the experiments in your own lab.
4. So what’s the NSABB decision about? Is it really about “security” –
whatever “security” might be, or is it a response to public fears created by the very
scientists who conducted the experiments, boasting that they had produced „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.”
5. Deleuze: “Every work implies a way of living, a form of life, and must be evaluated
not only critically but also clinically.” Fouchier (referring to his own work): „probably
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” What form of life does such a claim
about his work imply? What does it take for a scientist to argue that he has “created
one of the most dangerous viruses you can make” and even be proud of it. Please
evaluate critically and clinically.
6. If you argue in public that you have created „probably one of the most dangerous
viruses you can make,” can you then be surprised about the decision of the NSABB
to prevent the publication of certain information? Nietzsche: “We are unknown to
ourselves, we men of knowledge.“
7. Usually, when you adapt a human influenza virus to animals, it loses it’s ability
to infect humans. That’s also the reason why some scientists are skeptical about
Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s claims. Adapting the H5 virus to ferrets means adapting
it to ferrets, not humans. It’s unknown whether this virus has a better ability to infect
humans now that it has been adapted to ferrets. Transmission is just one factor, but
there are many other factors and most of them may (or may not) make it difficult for
the virus to infect humans.
8. The ferret is a good model for experimental research, but not necessarily for
humans. The ferrets sneeze and that’s how the virus is spreading among the animals.
Transmission in humans does not occur by sneezing but by coughing. Ferrets develop
neurological symptoms, which is usually not observed in humans. According to Peter
Palese “there’s plenty of evidence that ferrets are a much too sensitive system.”
9. When the swine flu virus emerged in the United States in April 2009, researchers
tested it in ferrets, concluding that there was a mortality rate of 30% to 50%.
Obviously, that was not a particularly good prediction for what happened in 2009. It
certainly didn’t kill 30% to 50% of the human population.
10. Usually, the ferrets that are used in experimental research are completely naïve
animals. They have never been exposed to flu viruses and have thus no immunity at
all. Obviously the case in the human population is quite different. Not only is there
always at least a partial immunity to flu viruses due to prior infections with other
strains. Also, a new virus has to compete in a population of other flu viruses. So
it’s unclear whether this virus would have the ability to replace the flu viruses that
are currently spreading among humans. In 1976 there was a local epidemic in New
Jersey. The new flu viruses transmitted among humans, but it disappeared and never
reappeared again.
11. What surprised many scientists is that the virus produced by Kawaoka and Fouchier
has only five mutations and that all mutations have already been observed in nature.
Scientists have thus argued that if it were that simple for the virus to become
transmissible among humans, the pandemic would already have occurred.
12. Both Kawaoka and Fouchier are not shy when it comes to make big claims in public.
Both have been arguing for the past ten years that the H5 virus is a very likely
candidate for the next pandemic. Keep in mind that until today their predictions have
been wrong.
13. “I can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don’t think
anthrax is scary at all compared to this.” Said Paul Keim, member of the NSABB.
The virus produced in the laboratory has not yet killed a single human being. It has
not been shown that it really is able to transmit among humans. The total number of
deaths for the H5 virus that is currently circulating in Asia is 339. Compare this to
HIV, or to Japanese Encephalitis. To what does “scary” refer here?
Read more about Carlo’s work here (in German):
http://www.uzh.ch/news/articles/2012/die-pandemie-der-panik.html
Hi Lyle
Thanks for the excellent comments on the recent H5N1 events and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s Justification.
I actually think that the answer to your questions can be found in La Condition foetale, that doesn’t seem to be translated into English. We had many discussions with Boltanski about Lévi-Strauss while he was writing this book, and the way he re-used Lévi-Strauss about abortion really helped me to think about Mad Cow Disease and Avian Flu.
“Cités” are not eternal and justification is not universal : they are historically dated in the West, and new “cités” can appear, such as “cité par projet” that appears, following New Siprit of Capitalism, in the 1970′s. When new cités appear, there is a need for justification and a situation of violence. Scandal is the way this need for justification is expressed (see my analysis of the tainted milk scandal, published in China Perspectives). A cité emerges out of a scandal as a stabilized form of justification (food safety regulation in China for instance) but it is always submitted to critic. The question raised by Boltanski in his last book, De la critique, is how critique uses the ontological uncertainty of the life-world to destabilize “cités” or institutions. This is how I interpret the mutations of H5N1 as constituting “un monde grippé” which no bounded form of justice can enclose.
Now I think it would be very interesting to see ho Boltanski’s reflections on “confirmation” (when you expect an event that is uncertain but already has a name, such as the birth of a baby or the outbreak of a pandemic) enlighten our discussions on “preparedness”.
Cheers
Frederic
In a further development, the scientists involved in the above research have now paused all research for sixty days. “We and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.” The sixty days are said to be necessary because “organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work.” Its hard to imagine that in sixty days, discussion and debate will lead to solutions to the potential dangers posed by the viruses they created! Ultimately, they seem more worried about the public “perception of fear” they have created than the virus itself. Moreover, they continue to focus on the idea of ‘minimizing risk’ and proudly declaim that they are using “the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory” [not quite true: BSL3 not BSL4]. A commenter on the Science website responds: what most of us are worried about is not the virus escaping accidentally from the lab (i.e. biosafety), but the malicious release of the virus. See the letter here: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/481443a.html
New York Times article here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/science/scientists-to-pause-research-on-deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?src=recg