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	<title>Comments on: The Social</title>
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	<description>An ARC blog</description>
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		<title>By: Amelia Moore</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-334</link>
		<dc:creator>Amelia Moore</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Mar 2007 03:13:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-334</guid>
		<description>I like what Limor says about encountering &quot;post socials&quot; to prior socials, yet still encountering a necessary &quot;social&quot; in certain arenas.  This relates to Rabinow&#039;s earlier post on whether ethical &quot;social consequences&quot; research might signify a post social arena.  I think that what Strathern is doing, arguably, is indicating a form of the &quot;social&quot; that remains, or that is remediated and &quot;demonstrated&quot; in the place of an operationally obsolete prior social (if i may be allowed to mix analytics).  So, perhaps we can begin to think that the term &quot;post social&quot; is not very sharp as it cannot shed light on these recent and remediated socials?  But it has been useful in pointing us toward contemporary performances of the social, so we must give it some credit.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I like what Limor says about encountering &#8220;post socials&#8221; to prior socials, yet still encountering a necessary &#8220;social&#8221; in certain arenas.  This relates to Rabinow&#8217;s earlier post on whether ethical &#8220;social consequences&#8221; research might signify a post social arena.  I think that what Strathern is doing, arguably, is indicating a form of the &#8220;social&#8221; that remains, or that is remediated and &#8220;demonstrated&#8221; in the place of an operationally obsolete prior social (if i may be allowed to mix analytics).  So, perhaps we can begin to think that the term &#8220;post social&#8221; is not very sharp as it cannot shed light on these recent and remediated socials?  But it has been useful in pointing us toward contemporary performances of the social, so we must give it some credit.</p>
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		<title>By: Limor Darash</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-167</link>
		<dc:creator>Limor Darash</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 2007 19:28:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-167</guid>
		<description>I think that one distinction that might help in this conversation is:
â€œa socialâ€ vs. â€œthe socialâ€. Based on Deleuze distinction between â€œa lifeâ€ and â€œthe lifeâ€; or â€œan eventâ€ and â€œthe eventâ€ (ideal events/ real events). Whereas the former is the virtual; meaning, it centers on multiplicities and singularities, the latter is always one actual form, even if it presents a collective, global, general form.
â€œImmanence and a life thus suppose one another. For immanence is pure only when it is not immanent to a prior subject or object, mind or matter, only when, neither innate nor acquired, it is always yet â€œin the makingâ€; and â€œa lifeâ€ is a potential or virtuality subsisting in just such a purely immanent plane. Unlike the life of an individual, a life is thus necessarily vague or indefinite, and this indefiniteness is realâ€¦. We are and remain â€œanybodiesâ€ before we become â€œsomebodiesâ€. (Deleuze, 2001: 13-14)
â€œThe socialâ€ is the term for the â€œindividualâ€ the actual version which differs from the multiplicity of â€œa socialâ€ (even if it is indeed presented as a collective form with the logic of â€œweâ€, or a perspective of â€œthe entireâ€ social, yet it is always one alternative, â€œthe socialâ€ and not â€œa socialâ€). In that line of thought what Carlo suggests in terms of problematization, is at the level of â€œa socialâ€, and the question will remain whether the problem of VSS is of â€œa socialâ€? The genealogy Rose suggests is tracing the specific types of â€œthe socialâ€. In this level we should ask â€œwhat specific type of â€œthe socialâ€ is configured in the current VSS? This might be â€œa post- socialâ€ to a previous one, yet it is always another version of â€œthe socialâ€. All forms (solutions) of â€œthe socialâ€ are related to â€œa socialâ€ as a problematization. With this distinction we are still dealing with the problem of â€œa socialâ€ which is â€œalways yetâ€ in becoming, yet observing a new â€œthe socialâ€ yet to define periodically.
 â€œProblems are of the order of events- not only because cases of solution emerge like real events, but because the conditions of a problem themselves imply events such as sections, ablation, adjunctions. In this sense, it is correct to represent a double series of events which develop on two planes, echoing without resembling each other: real events on the level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions of the problem.â€ (Deleuze: 1994, 188)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think that one distinction that might help in this conversation is:<br />
â€œa socialâ€ vs. â€œthe socialâ€. Based on Deleuze distinction between â€œa lifeâ€ and â€œthe lifeâ€; or â€œan eventâ€ and â€œthe eventâ€ (ideal events/ real events). Whereas the former is the virtual; meaning, it centers on multiplicities and singularities, the latter is always one actual form, even if it presents a collective, global, general form.<br />
â€œImmanence and a life thus suppose one another. For immanence is pure only when it is not immanent to a prior subject or object, mind or matter, only when, neither innate nor acquired, it is always yet â€œin the makingâ€; and â€œa lifeâ€ is a potential or virtuality subsisting in just such a purely immanent plane. Unlike the life of an individual, a life is thus necessarily vague or indefinite, and this indefiniteness is realâ€¦. We are and remain â€œanybodiesâ€ before we become â€œsomebodiesâ€. (Deleuze, 2001: 13-14)<br />
â€œThe socialâ€ is the term for the â€œindividualâ€ the actual version which differs from the multiplicity of â€œa socialâ€ (even if it is indeed presented as a collective form with the logic of â€œweâ€, or a perspective of â€œthe entireâ€ social, yet it is always one alternative, â€œthe socialâ€ and not â€œa socialâ€). In that line of thought what Carlo suggests in terms of problematization, is at the level of â€œa socialâ€, and the question will remain whether the problem of VSS is of â€œa socialâ€? The genealogy Rose suggests is tracing the specific types of â€œthe socialâ€. In this level we should ask â€œwhat specific type of â€œthe socialâ€ is configured in the current VSS? This might be â€œa post- socialâ€ to a previous one, yet it is always another version of â€œthe socialâ€. All forms (solutions) of â€œthe socialâ€ are related to â€œa socialâ€ as a problematization. With this distinction we are still dealing with the problem of â€œa socialâ€ which is â€œalways yetâ€ in becoming, yet observing a new â€œthe socialâ€ yet to define periodically.<br />
 â€œProblems are of the order of events- not only because cases of solution emerge like real events, but because the conditions of a problem themselves imply events such as sections, ablation, adjunctions. In this sense, it is correct to represent a double series of events which develop on two planes, echoing without resembling each other: real events on the level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions of the problem.â€ (Deleuze: 1994, 188)</p>
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		<title>By: Lab Notes &#187; Changes to the Wiki</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-104</link>
		<dc:creator>Lab Notes &#187; Changes to the Wiki</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Feb 2007 22:30:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-104</guid>
		<description>[...] energy out there.Â  Inspired by at least three different conversation going on right now (&#8221;The Social&#8221; on the Biopower and the Contemporary Blog , The discussion of metaphor and ideology on Lab [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] energy out there.Â  Inspired by at least three different conversation going on right now (&#8221;The Social&#8221; on the Biopower and the Contemporary Blog , The discussion of metaphor and ideology on Lab [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Karpiak</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-72</link>
		<dc:creator>Karpiak</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2007 05:10:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-72</guid>
		<description>For another measure of distance from classic notions of &quot;the social&quot;, see Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm recent commentary on the relation between the public sphere and the economy (specifically in reaction to proposals by French presidential candidates Segolene Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy to make national politicians more involved with the European Central Bank):

&quot;If you discuss a problem without solving it, the effect will only be more uncertainty and more unrest ... We spend too much time talking about the economic situation -- it is like talking about the weather.&quot;

Habermas this is not.  But it does speak to Andy&#039;s suggestion that humans with VSS are more akin to &quot;things&quot; than social beings.  For Zalm, in fact, sociality (in the form of incessant discussion) is itself a vital risk.

you can see the whole article at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/45d6e49a-bbd0-11db-afe4-0000779e2340.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For another measure of distance from classic notions of &#8220;the social&#8221;, see Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm recent commentary on the relation between the public sphere and the economy (specifically in reaction to proposals by French presidential candidates Segolene Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy to make national politicians more involved with the European Central Bank):</p>
<p>&#8220;If you discuss a problem without solving it, the effect will only be more uncertainty and more unrest &#8230; We spend too much time talking about the economic situation &#8212; it is like talking about the weather.&#8221;</p>
<p>Habermas this is not.  But it does speak to Andy&#8217;s suggestion that humans with VSS are more akin to &#8220;things&#8221; than social beings.  For Zalm, in fact, sociality (in the form of incessant discussion) is itself a vital risk.</p>
<p>you can see the whole article at <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/45d6e49a-bbd0-11db-afe4-0000779e2340.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/45d6e49a-bbd0-11db-afe4-0000779e2340.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: Carlo Caduff</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-43</link>
		<dc:creator>Carlo Caduff</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2007 23:00:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-43</guid>
		<description>This is excellent. Just consider Nowotny&#039;s felicitous phrase of &quot;society speaking back to science&quot; and you&#039;ll see how far this is from Durkheim. How do we call this new object of representation and intervention that is not the population?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is excellent. Just consider Nowotny&#8217;s felicitous phrase of &#8220;society speaking back to science&#8221; and you&#8217;ll see how far this is from Durkheim. How do we call this new object of representation and intervention that is not the population?</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Rabinow</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-19</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Rabinow</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Feb 2007 20:30:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-19</guid>
		<description>I wonder whether the demand for &quot;social consequences&quot; as the subject matter or substance of &#039;ethics&quot; is a change beyond the social? Strathern&#039;s suggestion that society must be invented, not protected, so that it can be ethically regulated is an excellent starting point. Perhaps we could explore this some more. 
Bureaucracy permitting I hope to write something on this topic. HELP!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wonder whether the demand for &#8220;social consequences&#8221; as the subject matter or substance of &#8216;ethics&#8221; is a change beyond the social? Strathern&#8217;s suggestion that society must be invented, not protected, so that it can be ethically regulated is an excellent starting point. Perhaps we could explore this some more.<br />
Bureaucracy permitting I hope to write something on this topic. HELP!</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Rabinow</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-18</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Rabinow</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Feb 2007 20:24:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-18</guid>
		<description>What a welcome relief to see a discussion beginning.
One view: It has become the case that multiple points of the apparatuses of the social-- instituted to protect and insure and motivate the health, well-being and productivity of the population and the people -- have become the sites of vulnerability. If there is a post-social form emergent or emerged than it must have elements outside the previous form. And must be in a transformed problem space (as Carlo is indicating).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What a welcome relief to see a discussion beginning.<br />
One view: It has become the case that multiple points of the apparatuses of the social&#8211; instituted to protect and insure and motivate the health, well-being and productivity of the population and the people &#8212; have become the sites of vulnerability. If there is a post-social form emergent or emerged than it must have elements outside the previous form. And must be in a transformed problem space (as Carlo is indicating).</p>
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		<title>By: Carlo Caduff</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-14</link>
		<dc:creator>Carlo Caduff</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Feb 2007 03:26:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-14</guid>
		<description>In my view, the social refers in Foucault primarily to a problem, and the population to its corresponding object. I think it is helpful to keep the two separate. Just as there was not simply a population out there that called to be governed, there are not simply critical systems out there that need to be secured. Since these critical systems are very old partly and have always been vulnerable, I think it might be interesting to think more intensely about why there is so much concern about them today. So what is the problem that gives rise to vss if it is not the social? And if the interventions do not take the form of normalization, what shape do they take instead?

And: How can we arrive at a critical account of some of the concerns around vss? For Foucault, genealogy was a form of critical intervention. It might be interesting to think about this in more detail. 

Dale&#039;s example is interesting. So while in the case of smallpox hospital staff is being vaccinated by means of a massive federal program for a largely hypothetical event, you have a rate of influenza vaccination among healthcare workers that remains far too low. Money and resources are going into fancy preparedness rather than old-fashioned prevention.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my view, the social refers in Foucault primarily to a problem, and the population to its corresponding object. I think it is helpful to keep the two separate. Just as there was not simply a population out there that called to be governed, there are not simply critical systems out there that need to be secured. Since these critical systems are very old partly and have always been vulnerable, I think it might be interesting to think more intensely about why there is so much concern about them today. So what is the problem that gives rise to vss if it is not the social? And if the interventions do not take the form of normalization, what shape do they take instead?</p>
<p>And: How can we arrive at a critical account of some of the concerns around vss? For Foucault, genealogy was a form of critical intervention. It might be interesting to think about this in more detail. </p>
<p>Dale&#8217;s example is interesting. So while in the case of smallpox hospital staff is being vaccinated by means of a massive federal program for a largely hypothetical event, you have a rate of influenza vaccination among healthcare workers that remains far too low. Money and resources are going into fancy preparedness rather than old-fashioned prevention.</p>
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		<title>By: Dale A. Rose</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-13</link>
		<dc:creator>Dale A. Rose</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Feb 2007 20:33:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-13</guid>
		<description>Andy&#039;s last point is particularly well-taken, as the smallpox work I&#039;ve been doing suggests that interventions oriented towards vulnerabilities associated with the disease are operating on new configurations of groups of people.  &quot;First responders&quot; are an excellent example of a group of people occupying various institutional and professional domains, who have come to be constituted as a) essential elements of various vital systems, and b) critical as a first layer of defense in the shoring up of various vulnerabilities.  By (identifying and then) vaccinating &quot;them&quot;, previous specific vulnerabilities are lessened, but of course, new ones are then produced.  Think only, for example, of the families of first responders or immunocompromised patients in an ICU who are now at increased risk of acquiring smallpox by virtue of exposure to live virus, as shed by vaccinees.  While babies and cancer patients tend not to be thought of as constituting the human stuff of most vital systems, per se, the very fact of increased risk feeds back on decisions by first responders to get vaccinated in the first place.

The point, then, is that there do indeed seem to be relatively new ways of constituting these groups, with new demands placed upon them.  While first responders have, of course, existed prior to either preparedness or vital systems, they are now being thought of in different ways.

Equally as important, the specific mechanisms that enjoin these groups to do certain things (e.g., get vaccinated) are tenuous, and ironically, perhaps less effective than previous similar efforts.  The irony is that the technology involved in this instance -- vaccines -- is essentially the same.  Think only of the requirement of healthcare workers (and infants, and school attendees, and daycare providers, and first responders, and...) to get hepatitis B vaccine.  Rates of vaccination are extremely high, generally speaking.  Obviously, there&#039;s a lot more that can be said, but I&#039;ll just end with what I see as a need not only for terminological clarity, but empirical rigor as well: How are groups like first responders being constituted as, in fact, vital?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andy&#8217;s last point is particularly well-taken, as the smallpox work I&#8217;ve been doing suggests that interventions oriented towards vulnerabilities associated with the disease are operating on new configurations of groups of people.  &#8220;First responders&#8221; are an excellent example of a group of people occupying various institutional and professional domains, who have come to be constituted as a) essential elements of various vital systems, and b) critical as a first layer of defense in the shoring up of various vulnerabilities.  By (identifying and then) vaccinating &#8220;them&#8221;, previous specific vulnerabilities are lessened, but of course, new ones are then produced.  Think only, for example, of the families of first responders or immunocompromised patients in an ICU who are now at increased risk of acquiring smallpox by virtue of exposure to live virus, as shed by vaccinees.  While babies and cancer patients tend not to be thought of as constituting the human stuff of most vital systems, per se, the very fact of increased risk feeds back on decisions by first responders to get vaccinated in the first place.</p>
<p>The point, then, is that there do indeed seem to be relatively new ways of constituting these groups, with new demands placed upon them.  While first responders have, of course, existed prior to either preparedness or vital systems, they are now being thought of in different ways.</p>
<p>Equally as important, the specific mechanisms that enjoin these groups to do certain things (e.g., get vaccinated) are tenuous, and ironically, perhaps less effective than previous similar efforts.  The irony is that the technology involved in this instance &#8212; vaccines &#8212; is essentially the same.  Think only of the requirement of healthcare workers (and infants, and school attendees, and daycare providers, and first responders, and&#8230;) to get hepatitis B vaccine.  Rates of vaccination are extremely high, generally speaking.  Obviously, there&#8217;s a lot more that can be said, but I&#8217;ll just end with what I see as a need not only for terminological clarity, but empirical rigor as well: How are groups like first responders being constituted as, in fact, vital?</p>
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		<title>By: scollier</title>
		<link>http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/comment-page-1/#comment-9</link>
		<dc:creator>scollier</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2007 20:28:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://anthropos-lab.net/bpc/2007/01/the-social/#comment-9</guid>
		<description>Andy&#039;s summary is excellent. I commend it to everybody, and this it is a useful point of discussion.

One of the immediate responses I have is that this is a very specific story about what &quot;the social&quot; is. It does not include a large number of things that were done to govern collective life in the name of society. And the story that he tells coming out of the 19th century is also a very particular one. A similar story about the transposition of moral categories onto &quot;social characteristics&quot; could be told 100 years earlier in Britain -- indeed, that is the entire story of Polanyi&#039;s &quot;The Great Transformation.&quot;

There are many things on this level, but I think that the broader point is that we may be sharpening how we pose the question &quot;is vss about the social?&quot; I think that Andy correctly points out here (and inthe earlier exchange) that vss does not involve the detailed knowledge about the regularities of collective life (although I am not convinced that these do not reappear at times in a different guise). And I think that it is also the case that vss does not seek to regulate the routine, recurrent, structured activities of individuals as social beings, at least not in the way that Rose thinks about them. So indeed: neither the knowledge-form nor the modality of intervention resemble those of &quot;social modernity.&quot;

But that said, it does not seem right to me to say that the field over which vss operates is not that of the social -- or &quot;society&quot; in the sense it was &quot;discovered&#039; in the late 18th and early 18th century. Systems are &quot;vital&quot; precisely because they are essential to the functioning of collective life -- including political institutions and the economy, but also including things like hospitals, systems of supply, markets, upon which we all depend. It is the reality of all these interconnected elements of collective life that the French Physiocrats and the British liberals &quot;discovered&quot; as the new basis for human life. So clearly we have need for further terminological clarification.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andy&#8217;s summary is excellent. I commend it to everybody, and this it is a useful point of discussion.</p>
<p>One of the immediate responses I have is that this is a very specific story about what &#8220;the social&#8221; is. It does not include a large number of things that were done to govern collective life in the name of society. And the story that he tells coming out of the 19th century is also a very particular one. A similar story about the transposition of moral categories onto &#8220;social characteristics&#8221; could be told 100 years earlier in Britain &#8212; indeed, that is the entire story of Polanyi&#8217;s &#8220;The Great Transformation.&#8221;</p>
<p>There are many things on this level, but I think that the broader point is that we may be sharpening how we pose the question &#8220;is vss about the social?&#8221; I think that Andy correctly points out here (and inthe earlier exchange) that vss does not involve the detailed knowledge about the regularities of collective life (although I am not convinced that these do not reappear at times in a different guise). And I think that it is also the case that vss does not seek to regulate the routine, recurrent, structured activities of individuals as social beings, at least not in the way that Rose thinks about them. So indeed: neither the knowledge-form nor the modality of intervention resemble those of &#8220;social modernity.&#8221;</p>
<p>But that said, it does not seem right to me to say that the field over which vss operates is not that of the social &#8212; or &#8220;society&#8221; in the sense it was &#8220;discovered&#8217; in the late 18th and early 18th century. Systems are &#8220;vital&#8221; precisely because they are essential to the functioning of collective life &#8212; including political institutions and the economy, but also including things like hospitals, systems of supply, markets, upon which we all depend. It is the reality of all these interconnected elements of collective life that the French Physiocrats and the British liberals &#8220;discovered&#8221; as the new basis for human life. So clearly we have need for further terminological clarification.</p>
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