On the Assembly of Things

ARC Collaboratory: Ramifying Synthetic Biology and Nanotechnology

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Returning to Sloterdijk

July 17th, 2009 by stavrianakis
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just a note prompted by returning to the three Sloterdijk posts by PR in May:

In my field site, as perhaps is common, I have found informants want to frame what I am doing and then tell me what my object of interest should be. For example, ‘here we work just with bacteria, so you should probably talk with this other person who works on eukaryotes and circadian questions, which have much many more ethical questions’. It has been difficult to find a language in which to explain that whilst the ‘thing’ worked on with molecular tools may not be ‘human’, it still has effects, displacements and ramifications that need to be taken seriously.

If as PR pointed out, Sloterdijk, via Luhmann, gives a definition of terrorism as involving  an explicit concept of the environment, the reason being that terror involves the displacement of destructive action from the ‘system’ onto the environment, then precisely one of the problems around security and novel technologies , especially in synthetic biology, is that those working on systems have not considered the displacements.  In part this returns to a number of conversations at the human practices lab at SynBERC about the need to take up the moral imaginary, as part of the security landscape, of those engineering biology (among other materials).

Whilst it may be true that “the terror of our times consists in the emergence of a knowledge of modernized elimination that passes through a theory of the environment”, the immaturity of our times is the topological insulation of the objects of knowledge from something like a ‘complex enough’ ‘theory of environment’. Or perhaps actually it is that the theory of environment that the objects of knowledge pass through is inadequate, precisely because, in Luhmann’s terms, the usual theory of environment is one in which the “products of risk calculation are accepted  when it does not touch the threshold beyond which a disaster would occur”. Of course, as he suggests, this not touching the threshold  is what allows decisions to be made. This is not to say that, for instance, Amyris Biotech shouldn’t be trying to develop cheap synthetic versions of artemesinin to be used in combination therapies  and instead we should just buy more mosquito nets (which some grassroots activists have suggested), or there should not be effort to develop cellular chasses  with changed molecular characteristics. Indeed, it is right that such technologies be submitted to kinds of risk calculation that allow for the possibility of moving ‘onward’ with such projects.  But one should also say that those inventing powerful technologies need to find ways to engage arguments made on ‘collateral’ grounds, the collateral used, and the collateral effects of the generation of novel solutions, products and the like for ‘the world’s most pressing challenges’ (which has become a term of art).

Unexpectedly , an informant left a copy of “Goedel: a life in logic” on my desk this morning, it is perhaps a way to very quickly and basically introduce more widely the idea that truth and proof are not co-terminus.

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Collaboration

June 25th, 2009 by rabinow
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Friends,

As we move toward the month of  July, and as several of you are either in a new position or have just finished a major piece of work, or are feeling the itch, we should think (and act) together about infusing ARC with some new drive and energy.

We are fortunate to have an excellent assistant now– thanks Andy!

Meg and I had a good talk yesterday about beginning to think about the early stages of a collaborative effort. We all agree that a lot has been done on security both in individual projects, dyadic interactions, labinars and other venues. Perhaps it is time not so much to leave that behind but to think concretely about how to move onward!

Thoughts people?

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Dewey, liberalism, Neibuhr

June 22nd, 2009 by rabinow
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Reinhold Neibuhr, “The Pathos of Liberalism”, the Nation, vol. 141., no. 3662, 11 September 1935

No one in America has a more generally conceded right to speak in the name of liberalism than John Dewey. [  ] “Liberalism,” declares Professor Dewey, “must now become radical, meaning by radical perception of thoroughgoing changes in the set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring the changes to pass.” This social radicalism is gradualistic  in method but not reformist.

[his] weakness reveals itself at every turn. The possibilities of intelligence in social action are supposedly proved by the achievements of science in the development of technical civilization. [ ...] The inability to recognize the perennial enslavement of even ‘freed intelligence’ to partial and particular interests is revealed in Professor Dewey’s discussion of violence and social change.

“Dewey: The idea that the conflict of parties wil, by means of public discussion, bring out necessary public truths” has nothing “in common with the procedure of organized cooperative inquiry, which has won the triumphs of science the field of physical nature.”

Niebuhr: “Whatever the possibilities and necessities of social intelligence in social action, that thesis is a hopeless one. In so far as a ‘renascent liberalism’ rests upon it, it will confuse the political problem. Its stubborness in maintaining the thesis imparts an aspect of pathos to even so courageous and honest a liberalism as that of Professor Dewey.”

THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DEWEY, 153-57, Hackett publishers

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Philosophy at the movies

June 2nd, 2009 by rabinow
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By chance and browsing at our local video store, I have come across three films on philosophers.

Roberto Rosselini’s — Spinoza, Descartes– are period costume pieces with a static theatrical approach but curious in their own right. Who knew that Descartes had a child?

“When Nietzsche Wept” — terrific mustache!

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Vital Environment Insecurity

May 24th, 2009 by rabinow
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If we take Sloterdijk’s use of Luhmann’s system/environment distinction into account we might give ourselves some more conceptual and rhetorical space around VSS.

It would be nice if Tobias, Carlo, Nicolas and other German readers could make some comments.

I have quickly read two volumes of Spheren in French.

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Sloterdijk-2

May 24th, 2009 by rabinow
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Perhaps here is a more “correct” definition of vital …

The terror of our times consists in the emergence of a knowledge of modernized elimination that passes through a theory of the environment, the strength of which is that it enables the terrorist to understand his victims better than they understand themselves. (16)

Attacks on ecologically dependent vital functions: respiration, central nervous regulation, and sustainable temperature and radiation conditions. (16)

The precise sense of the word terrorism presupposes an explicit concept of the environment, the reason being that terror involves the displacement of destructive action from the ‘system’ (here: the enemy’s body) onto his ‘environment’—in this case at hand: the air milieu in which enemy bodies moves, subject to their own breathing reflex. (22)… the malign exploitation of the victim’s life-sustaining habits.

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Sloterdijk- On the vital (environment)

May 24th, 2009 by rabinow
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Sloterdijk’s 2002 lecture recently published by Semiotexte is worth reading for us. It is a short version of his extensive multi-volume “Spheres” series. I post a few quotes here for people to comment on. The bulk of the lecture is a kind of history of gaswarfare on both humans and “pests”.

Peter Sloterdijk Terror from the Air

NY: Semiotext(e), 2009, (orig. 2002)

“Anybody wanting to grasp the originality of the era has to consider: the practice of terrorism, the concept of product design, and environmental thinking. With the first, enemy interaction was established on a post-militaristic basis; with the second, functionalism was enabled to re-connect to the world of perceptions; and with the third, phenomena of life and knowledge became more profoundly linked than ever before. (9)

Taken together, all three mark acceleration in ‘explication’. In other words; the revealing-inclusion of the background givens underlying manifest operations. (9)

…the introduction of the environment into the battle between adversaries. (13)

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Branching out…

April 24th, 2009 by ckelty
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Just a note to say that I am heading to Madrid next week to make some new friends at the EOI Escuela de Negocios in Madrid to be part of a series on “EcoInnovation and the future of Open Economies.” Thoughts on what to say in this context (and friends in Madrid) welcome!

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History and its penumbras

April 12th, 2009 by rabinow
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Everyone knows, of course, that the laws of history are worth as little for directing research into the recent past as they are for making any reasonable presuppositions about tomorrow’s events.  Besides, they are modest enough to postpone their certainties until the day after tomorrow, and not too prudish either to allow for the adjustments that permit predictions to be made about what happened yesterday.

If, therefore, their role in progress is rather slight, their interest nevertheless lies elswhere: in their considerable role as ideals.  For it leads us to distinguish between what might be called primary and secondary functions of historicization [...]

Events are engendered in a primal historicization– in other words, history is already being made on the stage where it will be played out once it has been written down, both in one’s heart of hearts and outside.

–Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, The Complete Ecrits, p. 216

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More biohacking (UK angle)

April 10th, 2009 by mstalcup
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The geneticist in the garage

Citizen scientists are setting up their own gene laboratories in the hope of inventing new and useful organisms. But are they a danger to us all?

The Guardian, Thursday 19 March 2009 00.27 GMT

Meredith L. Patterson

Meredith Patterson at work in her home lab. Photograph: Noah Berger/AP


Meredith Patterson is not your typical genetic scientist. Her laboratory is based in the dining room of her San Francisco apartment. She uses a plastic salad spinner as a centrifuge and Ziploc plastic bags as airtight containers for her samples. But the genetically modified organism (GMO) she is attempting to create on a budget of less than $500 (£350) could provide a breakthrough in food safety.

The 31-year-old ex-computer programmer and now biohacker is working on modifying jellyfish genes and adding them to yoghurt to detect the toxic chemical melamine, which was found in baby milk in China last year after causing a number of deaths, and kidney damage to thousands of infants. Her idea is to engineer yoghurt so that in the presence of the toxin it turns fluorescent green, warning the producer that the food is contaminated. If her experiment is successful, she will release the design into the public domain.

“I haven’t had a huge amount of success so far,” says Patterson. “But science is often about failing until you get it right.” She has decided to invest in an electro­porator she found on eBay for $150, which should speed things up. “It’s actually not that hard. It’s a bit like making yoghurt. And if there’s material left over from the experiment, I can eat it,” she says.

Evolving community

Patterson is just one of dozens of citizen scientists setting up their own gene laboratories in the hope of inventing new and useful organisms. A community is evolving to take advantage of low-cost, off-the-shelf genetic parts and increasing knowledge in biological engineering. International competitions such as the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) and io9 Mad Science contest have already produced a number of stars, with practical innovations in medicine, agriculture and biocomputing.

However, Helen Wallace of GeneWatch in the UK thinks biohacking could be dangerous. “It is increasingly easy to order genes by mail,” she says. “Something like smallpox is hard to get, but there are other organisms that could become harmful. If you change a living organism’s properties, you could also change its interactions with the environment or the human body.” She adds: “Scientists are notorious for not seeing the unintended consequences.”

Reshma Shetty is part of the team behind Ginkgo Bioworks, a Massachusetts-based company aiming to make DIY biotechnology a reality. She says: “Nowadays, biotechnology is like a medieval guild. Firstly, you have to get a PhD, but if you want to practise you then need venture capital, otherwise you don’t have the tools.” Ginkgo aims to make the process easier by offering off-the-shelf biological components and a third-party service for rapid prototyping. “This will take power away from patent owners like Monsanto and pave the way for more people to have a positive impact,” she says.

Ginkgo has already constructed GMOs that release the odour of bananas, turn red or glow in the dark, and is developing a host of new organisms that will all be in the public domain. “They’re not harmful pathogens,” she says. “Complex organisms make use of the same components to do all this incredible stuff without any harmful chemicals … In 10 years, all sorts of new stuff will have been done.”

Jim Thomas, of the environmental thinktank ETC Group, says: “The risk is we have limited knowledge of how these things work. GM crops have out-crossed [bred with non-GM plants] after we were told they wouldn’t. GM bacteria for transforming crops into biofuels have been shown to damage soil. Where is the oversight?”

MacKenzie Cowell is a founding member of Boston-based DIYbio, which provides tools and advice to biohackers. In May they will co-ordinate the first “Flash Lab”, sending out 1,000 volunteers to take swabs from pedestrian crossing buttons around Boston. The data will be analysed to produce a BioWeatherMap of bacteria roaming the city.

Outbreak

“We think we’ll pick up all sorts of surprising stuff,” says Cowell. “I was sick for three days with the symptoms of salmonella last year, before finding out there had been an outbreak in New York where I was staying.” This inspired him to start the project, which has been nicknamed “Google Flu“. “We hope to get out and do these once a month,” he says, “but it could happen far more frequently.”

Benefits may come from increased access and transparency in science, but sometimes the authorities have difficulty recognising it. In 2004, the art professor Steve Kurtz was arrested as a suspected bioterrorist because Petri dishes with bacteria in them were found at his home in New York state, after his wife had died of a heart attack. Last year Victor Deeb, a retired chemist, had his basement laboratory taken apart by US environmental officials after a fire in the apartment upstairs. He was trying to make safe surface coatings for food containers using chemicals less hazardous than those found in household cleaners.

In Britain, regulations are far stricter. Chris French, a lecturer at Edinburgh University and local biological safety officer, says: “There’s very little that can be done at a home address … GMOs are very strictly regulated by the Health and Safety Executive – and for sound reasons. Working with living things which can potentially escape and grow offers potential hazards.”

Surgical tasks

This hasn’t stopped UK university teams from developing a host of useful biological innovations over the last few years. One of the winners of last year’s iGEM competition was Bristol University’s Bacto-Builders project, using teams of E. coli bacteria to perform surgical tasks that single organisms would find impossible. Its project is moving forward in collaboration with the TiGEM genetics laboratory in Italy.

“We are in the nascent stages of some kind of DIY biotechnology network in the UK,” says Kim de Mora, a biology PhD student at Edinburgh University. “But … it’s going to be hard to set up a garage industry because of the regulations.”

De Mora was part of a team that developed an arsenic detector for contaminated water in Bangladesh. E. coli bacteria were modified using BioBrick components to produce a warning signal in the presence of arsenic. If their working prototype is developed into a commercial product, it will be much cheaper than existing technologies. “The real potential of biotechnology will explode in the UK after people are given access at home,” predicts De Mora.

In the meantime, iGEM’s global Registry of Standard Biological Parts is doubling the size of its catalogue of organic building blocks every year. Within the next decade, millions upon millions of new synthetic organisms are sure to be created. The question is: who will be allowed to create them? At the moment, it looks like the future of biotechnology could be more diverse and volatile than anyone had imagined.


The following correction was printed in the Guardian’s Corrections and clarifications column, Monday March 23 2009

We said in the report below that the BioWeatherMap project had been nicknamed Google Flu. To clarify, there is no connection between DIYbio, the organisation that runs BioWeatherMap, and Google

· This article was amended on Tuesday March 24 2009 to correct a quote from Jim Thomas. He said GM bacteria used for making biofuels, rather than GM biofuels had been shown to damage soil.

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