After meeting today with the PI of the SynBERC project, of which our (i.e. Paul Rabinow, Gaymon Bennett, and Anthony Stavrianakis) work in Human Practices is a part, Paul Rabinow and I were reflecting on some of the challenges of making Human Practices an integral part of scientific collaboration. Here are some initial thoughts:
Existing models for formal interaction among biologists and anthropologists and ethicists, as well as existing organizational practices and research structures in biology position the human and philosophical sciences outside of biological research per se. This positioning, among other reasons, constitutes a core rationale for the development of new arrangements—hence our work in designing and implementing the Human Practices approach. The persistence of this external positioning means that any entrance of the human and philosophical sciences into the space of biological research requires justification. This justification is expected to be articulated in terms of the benefits the human and philosophical sciences can offer to existing challenges and goals within the bio-scientific space in its present form. That is to say, the human and philosophical sciences are put in the position of having to articulate justifications for their presence within collaborations that are merely instrumental relative to the existing bio-scientific objectives; we are allowed in if we help them do what they are already doing more effectively.
Why is this a problem? First, it reduces the human and philosophical sciences to the position of consultants at best, handmaidens at worst (technical experts in any case) and thereby inhibits equality in collaboration. Second, and more importantly, it forces an accommodation of the supposition that human, philosophical, and biological scientists are working in separate problem domains and thereby reinforces the very practices that a Human Practices approach seeks to disrupt and remediate. In order for Human Practices to work, biologists and their funders must be willing to change their habits and self understanding such that they conceive of their work as existing within a shared domain of problems, problems shared with anthropologists, ethicists, and the like. If this can happen, and what form this would take, remains to be seen.
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funny you should mention this, I just finished justifying my participation with CBEN for their annual NSF report– I don’t have nearly as much weight there as you guys have in the SynBERC project, but I do have regular conversations with one of the directors about the problem of treating the human, philosophical and social sciences as afterthoughts to the “real” research.
On the one hand, I think there are a number of people trying to approach this problem–the ASU CNS program directed by Dave Guston speaks of “Real Time Technology Analysis”– which comes out of the world that was Technology Assessment, including the Office of Technology Assessment. They seem to be keen on getting people inside the labs, participating in lab meetings and trying to offer their expertise as something that is useful in the conceptualization of research as it happens, not just in the after the fact assessment. I don’t think they are pushing things as hard as Human Practices though…
On the other hand, I feel like there are very few scientists willing to take this step seriously, and not view it as a distraction from their work– my success in doing so comes primarily through friendship with scientists, such that my insights and ideas and questions are taken seriously not because of my expertise, but only because I care, and they care that I care. RIce is nice that way though–lots of very open people. On the third hand, the obvious difficulty is in being able to speak and reason not only about the human practices, but about the bio-scientific problems facing the group– which is tantamount to “helping them do what they do more effectively.”
On the fourth hand, of course, I think there are plenty of scientists who would be thrilled to have people such as us (only smarter and nicer of course) involved in their research, and able to justify it in vague but emphatic terms… but the problem comes primarily from the demands of funding agencies, grant proposals and audit culture, no? The demand to specify in precise terms the value added of what we bring…
This very problem is foundational for the work of Helga Nowotny and her colleagues, and it might be worth having a look at it. She is now institutionalizing a new regime very effictively on a European level. The points where we don’t agree with her work are clear. Nonetheless I think it might be worth outlining in detail why ‘interdisciplinarity’ is not the answer. Some of this work has already been done.
The problem of positioning is key, but it might be helpful to frame it in a different way. First, there is not only one domain, there are many domains, and it depends on which domain one invokes and constructs. As Chris points out, as a friend one can be more of an insider than some other lab “insiders”. But as anthropologists, we are necessarily disciplinary outsiders, since we’re not biologists. This means that one can position oneself at the same time as insider as well as outsider. It seems to depend on the frame that one choses. The disciplinary frame is one among many others.
My area of enquiry is to do with corporate ethical forms but your point about being “allowed in if we help them do what they are already doing more effectively” rings true. When you talk about “inhibiting equality in collaboration” I had to reflect on the sense I often get among informants that if I framed my work a certain way, I could be extremely valuable to them almost to the point of inequality. On one hand this seems a reflection of sharing a domain of problems and a view that social scientists hold a kind of ‘synthesized’ knowledge that companies seek to integrate into their processes. But on the other, rightly or wrongly, I hesitate from occupying that role without qualification.
A few points are worth highlighting. First, one of the challenges of collaboration with the biological and other natural sciences is that in fact second order observation, which is one of the skills that the human, social, and philosophical sciences bring to the table can contribute to the optimization of work that the biologists are already doing. As such there is potentially an instrumental value to what we are doing. The difficulty is not justifying our presence on that basis alone.
Second, the point on friendship is interesting. We too have been able to do much of our work on the basis of a certain trust. It is not at all clear to me that the biologists at SynBERC know what Human Practices is. However, they are allowing us room to function as more or less equal participants. This has more to do with Paul’s relationship with the other PIs than with anything else.
Third, Carlo is right to point to the difficulty of making shared problem spaces visible when distinctions in work capacities are understood in a disciplinary frame.A challenge is to develop clear characterizations of shared object and problem domains.